Contingency in the Late Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards
Journal for the History of Reformed Pietism
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Title |
Contingency in the Late Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards
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Creator |
Schultz, Walter J.
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Subject |
Philosophy, Early Modern History, American Religious History,
Philosophy, Early Modern History, American Religious History, |
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Description |
Jonathan Edwards is often portrayed as being a thoroughgoing determinist, thus precluding every sort of contingency. This judgment arises most often—and justifiably so— from what he asserts in his Freedom of the Will (1754). A contrary judgment emerges, however, when his dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World (completed in 1755) is closely considered by itself. 2 This paper describes and then shows how Edwards’ argumentation entails that the physical universe and its constituent physical systems are contingent in three senses: freedom to choose, existential, and synchronic.
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Publisher |
Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University
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Contributor |
—
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Date |
2021-11-29
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Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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Format |
application/pdf
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Identifier |
https://jestudies.yale.edu/index.php/journal/article/view/535
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Source |
Online Journal; Vol 11, No 2 (2021); 117-149
2159-6875 2159-6875 |
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Language |
eng
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Relation |
https://jestudies.yale.edu/index.php/journal/article/view/535/331
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Rights |
Copyright (c) 2021 Online Journal
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