Corruption and social norms

Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia

View Publication Info
Field Value
Title Corruption and social norms
Corrupción y normas sociales
Creator Senci, Carlos Maximiliano
Hasrun, Hipólito Manuel
Subject Corrupción; normas sociales; mecanismos; disonancia moral
Description The argument of this article has three parts: first, we argue that the theory of social norms is relevant to the study of corruption. This is so because corruption is a phenomenon that occurs in a specific context, within a given regulatory system, which allows certain interactions to be defined as “corrupt”. Second, we show that Coleman’s theory of social norms suffers from a theoretical deficit, since it does not admit certain subtleties in the explanation of the macro-to-micro transition (that is, how macrosocial phenomena influence individuals). Based on Coleman’s scheme of levels of social interaction, we point out an asymmetry not theorized by Coleman between the mechanisms of the micro-to-macro passage, which generate a macro level that is objective or, at least, common to many, and the macro-to-micro mechanisms, which start from a macro level that is not necessarily perceived in the same way by individuals, but is mediated by their beliefs about society; and this is more noticeable when it comes to a phenomenon such as corruption, in which there are strong incentives for secrecy, so it is not possible to affirm that the social level is objective (in terms of its perception by individuals) or common to many. There are, as we will see, mechanisms that intervene in the explanation of corruption that are related to the influence of social norms. Third, we will exemplify the macro-to-micro transition through the notion of normative expectations, and study the mechanisms that make it easier for individuals to perceive corrupt behavior as legitimate. Specifically, we will review different mechanisms that are interrelated and that refer to: modes of transaction, cognitive dissonance, narratives, and, pluralistic ignorance.
Este artículo tiene tres partes: en primer lugar, vamos a argumentar que la teoría de normas sociales es relevante para el estudio de la corrupción. Ello es así porque la corrupción es un fenómeno que se da en un contexto concreto, en el interior de un sistema normativo determinado, que permite definir ciertas interacciones como “corruptas”. En segundo, vamos a mostrar que la teoría de Coleman sobre las normas sociales adolece de un déficit teórico, ya que no admite ciertas sutilezas en la explicación de la transición de lo macro a lo micro (esto es, cómo los fenómenos macrosociales influyen en los individuos). A partir del esquema de Coleman sobre los niveles de interacción social, señalamos una asimetría no teorizada por el autor entre los mecanismos del paso de lo micro a lo macro, que generan un nivel macro que resulta objetivo o, al menos, común para muchos, y los mecanismos de lo macro a lo micro, que parten de un nivel macro que no necesariamente es percibido del mismo modo por los individuos, sino que está mediado por sus creencias sobre la sociedad; y esto es más notorio cuando se trata de un fenómeno como la corrupción, en el que hay fuertes incentivos para el secretismo, por lo que no es posible afirmar que el nivel social sea objetivo (en cuanto a su percepción por parte de los individuos) o común a muchos. Existen, como veremos, mecanismos que intervienen en la explicación de las conductas de corrupción que se relacionan con la influencia de las normas sociales. En tercer lugar, ejemplificaremos la transición de lo macro a lo micro a través de la noción de expectativas normativas, y estudiaremos los mecanismos que facilitan que los individuos perciban los comportamientos corruptos como legítimos. Específicamente, pasaremos revista a distintos mecanismos que están interrelacionados y que se refieren a: modos de transacción, disonancia cognitiva, narrativas e ignorancia pluralista.
Publisher Universidad El Bosque
Date 2020-04-03
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Format application/pdf
Source Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol 19 No 39 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; 221-261
Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; ##issue.vol## 19 39 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; 221-261
Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; Vol. 19 Núm. 39 (2019): Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia; 221-261
Language spa
/*ref*/Abbink, Klaus et ál. “The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers”. The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 34.3 (2018): 457-474. <> Aidt, Toke S. “Economic Analysis of Corruption: a Survey”. The Economic Journal 113 (2003): 632-652. <> Alm James, Bloomquist Kim M. y Michel McKee. “When You Know your Neighbors Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects and Tax Compliance”. Fiscal Studies 38.4 (2017): 587-613. <> Ashforth, B. E. y Anand, V. “The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations”. Research in Organizational Behavior 25 (2003): 1-52. <>
/*ref*/Anand, V., Ashforth, B. E. y M. Joshi. “Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations”. Academy of Management Executive 18 (2004): 39-53. <> Anders, G. y M. Nuijten. “Corruption and the Secret of Law: An Introduction”. Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective. Eds. M. Nuijten y G. Anders. Hampshire (UK): Ashgate Publishing Company, 2017. Andrighetto, Giulia, Grieco, Daniela y Luca Tummolini. “Perceived Legitimacy of Normative Expectations Motivates Compliance with Social Norms when Nobody is Watching”. Front. Psychol. 6 (2015): 1413. <> Andvig, Jens. “Corruption and Fast Change”. World Development 34.2 (2006): 328-340. <> Andvig, Jens y Karl Over Moene. “How Corruption May Corrupt”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 13.1 (1990): 63-76. <> Arellano Gault, David. “Corruption as an Organizational Process: Understanding the Logic of the Denormalization of Corruption”. Contaduría y Administración 62.3 (2017): 827-842. <> Ariely, D. The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone - Especially Ourselves. London: Harper Collins, 2012. Asch, S. E. “Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments”. Groups, Leadership, and Men. Ed. H. Guetzkow. Oxford, England: Carnegie Press, 1951. 177-190. Ashforth, Blake y Vikas Anand. “The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations”. Research in Organizational Behavior 25 (2003): 1-25. <> Bandura, Albert. “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities”. Personality and Social Psychology Review 3.3 (1999): 193-209. <> Banfield, E. C. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958. Bénabou, Roland, Tirole, Jean y Armin Falk. “Narratives, Imperatives and Moral Reasoning”. IZA Discussion Paper Series 11665 (2018). <> Bicchieri, Cristina. “Norms of Cooperation”. Ethics 100.4 (1990): 838-861. <> _____. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. <> _____. “The Fragility of Fairness: an Experimental Investigation on the Conditional Status of Pro-social Norms”. Philosophical Issues 18.1 (2008): 229-248. <> _____. Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. <> Bicchieri, Cristina y Deshani Ganegoda. “Determinants of Corruption: A Socio Psychological Analysis”. Thinking about Bribery: Neuroscience, Moral Cognition and the Psychology of Bribery. Eds. Philip M. Nichols y Diana C. Robertson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. <> Bicchieri, Cristina y Erte Xiao. “Do the Right Thing: But Only if Others Do So”. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22.2 (2009): 191-208. Bicchieri, Cristina y Peter McNally. “Shrieking Sirens. Schemata, Scripts, and Social Norms: How Change Occurs”. Philosophy, Politics and Economics 0005.1 (2016): 1-58. Bicchieri, C. y R. Muldoon. “Social Norms”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. <> Bicchieri, Cristina y Yoshitaka Fukui. “The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms”. Business Ethics Quarterly 9.1 (1999): 127-155. <> Boudon, Raymond. “Homo Sociologicus: Neither a Rational nor an Irrational Idiot”. Papers Revista de Sociología 80 (2006): 149-169. <> Chibnall, Steven y Peter Saunders. “Worlds Apart: Notes on the Social Reality of Corruption”. The British Journal of Sociology 28.2 (1977): 138-154. <> Chudek, M. y J. Henrich. “Culture-gene Coevolution, Norm-psychology and the Emergence of Human Prosociality”. Trends in Cognitive Science 15.5 (2011): 218-226. <> Chung, Adrienne y Rajiv N. Rimal. “Social Norms: A Review”. Review of Communication Research 4 (2016): 1-28. <> Cialdini, R.B., Reno, R.R., y Kallgren C.A. “A Focus Theory of Normative CONDUCT: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58 (1990): 1015–1026. <> Cialdini, R. B. y N. J. Goldstein. “Social influence: Compliance and Conformity”. Annual Review of Psychology 55 (2004): 591-621. <> Cialdini, Robert et ál. “Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact”. Social Influence 1.1 (2006): 3-15. <> Coleman, James. “Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action”. American Journal of Sociology 91 (1986): 1309-1335. _____. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1990. Cotton, John. L. y Rex A. Hieser. “Selective Exposure to Information and Cognitive Dissonance”. Journal of Research in Personality 14.4 (1980): 518-527. <> Dana, Jason, Weber, Roberto A. y Jason Kuang. “Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness”. Economic Theory 33.1 (2007): 67-80. <> Della Porta, D. y A. Vanucci. Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999. Dong, Bing. Dulleck, Uwe y Benno Torgler. “Conditional Corruption”. Journal of Economic Psychology 33.3 (2012): 609-627. <> Elster, Jon. Tuercas y tornillos. Una introducción a los conceptos básicos de las ciencias sociales. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1996. _____. “Norms”. The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. Eds. Peter Hedström y Peter Bearman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 195-217. _____. La explicación del comportamiento social. Más tuercas y tornillos para las ciencias sociales. Barcelona: Gedisa, 2010. Eriksson, Kimmo, Strimling, Pontus y Julie. C. Coultas. “Bidirectional Associations between Descriptive and Injunctive Norms”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 129 (2014): 59-69. <> Fehr, Ernst y Urs Fischbacher. “Social Norms and Human Cooperation”. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8.4 (2004): 185-190. <> Fehr, Ernst, Fischbacher, Urs y Simon Gächter. “Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms”. Human Nature 13.1 (2002): 1-25. <> Festinger, L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. Fisman, Raymond y Edward Miguel. “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets”. Journal of Political Economy 115.6 (2007): 1020-1048. <> Foucault, M. Les Mots et les Choses (une archéologie des sciences humaines). Paris: Gallimard, 1966. Gächter, Simon y Jonathan Schulz. “Intrinsic Honesty and the Prevalence of Rule Violations across Societies”. Nature 531.7595 (2016): 496-499. <> Gerber, Alan S. y Todd Rogers. “Descriptive Social Norms and Motivation to Vote: Everybody’s Voting and so should you”. The Journal of Politics 71.1 (2009): 178-191. <> Gintis, Herbert y Dirk Helbing. “Homo Socialis: An Analytical Core for Sociological Theory”. Review of Behavioral Economics 2.1-2 (2015): 1-59. <> Golman, Russell, Hagmann, David y George Loewenstein. “Information Avoidance”. Journal of Economic Literature 55.1 (2017): 96-135. <> Granovetter, Mark. “The Social Construction of Corruption”. On Capitalism. Eds. Victor Nee y Richard Swedberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. 152-172. Griffiths, J. “What is Legal Pluralism?” Journal of Legal Pluralism 18.24 (1986): 1-55. <> Grossman, Zachary y Joël J. van der Weele. “Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions”. Journal of the European Economic Association 15.1 (2017): 173-217. <> Guala, F. Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. <> Hauk, E. y M. Saez-Marti. “On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption”. Journal of Economic Theory 107.2 (2002): 311-335. <> Hedström, Peter. Dissecting the Social. On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005. <> Hirschman, A. O. The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Huntington, S. P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Jain, A. K. “Corruption: A Review”. Journal of Economic Surveys 15.1 (2001): 71-121. <> Jowitt, Ken. “Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime”. Soviet Studies 35.3 (1983): 275-297. <> Kashima, Yoshihisa et ál. “The Acquisition of Perceived Descriptive Norms as Social Category Learning in Social Networks”. Social Networks 35 (2013): 711-719. <> Kaufmann, D. “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption”. Global Competitiveness Report. World Economic Forum (2005): 81-98. Köbis, Nils, Iragorri, Daniel y Christopher Starke. “A Social Psychological View on the Social Norms of Corruption”. Corruption and Norms - Why Informal Rules Matter. Eds. I. Kubbe y A. Engelbert. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. <> Köbis, Nils et ál. “ ‘Who Doesn’t?’ — The Impact of Descriptive Norms on Corruption”. Plos One 10.6 (2015): e0131830. <> Konow, James. “Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions”. American Economic Review 90.4 (2000): 1072-1091. <> Kubbe, I. y A. Engelbert (eds). “Corruption and Norms”. Why Informal Rules Matter. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Kunda, Z. “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”. Psychological Bulletin 108.3 (1990): 480-498. <> Kuran, Timur. “Private and Public Preferences”. Economics and Philosophy 6.1 (1990): 1-26. <> _____. “Social Mechanisms of Dissonance Reduction”. Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Eds. Peter Hedström y Richard Swedberg New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 147-171. <> Lee, Wang-Sheng y Cahit Guven. “Engaging in Corruption: The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level”. Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013): 287-300. <> Lindström, Björn et ál. “The Role of a ‘Common Is Moral’ Heuristic in the Stability and Change of Moral Norms”. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147.2 (2018): 228-242. <> Mauro, P. “Corruption and Growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110.3 (1995): 681-712. <> Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. “Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment”. Journal of Democracy 17.3 (2006): 86-99. <> Noonan, J. T. Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea. California: University of California Press, 1987. Nye, J. S. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. American Political Science Review 61.2 (1967): 417-427. <> O’Gorman, Hubert J. “Pluralistic Ignorance and White Estimates of White Support for Racial Segregation”. Public Opinion Quarterly 39.3 (1975): 313-330. <> Paluck, Elizabeth L. “Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96.3 (2009): 574-587. <> Pellegrini, L. R. y Gerlagh. “Corruption’s Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels”. Kyklos 57.3 (2004): 429-456. <> Pinker, Steven, Nowak, Martin A. y James Lee. “The Logic of Indirect Speech”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105.3 (2008): 833-838. <> Pittarello, Andrea et ál. “The Relationship between Attention Allocation and Cheating”. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 23.2 (2016): 609-616. <> Prentice, Deborah. A. “Pluralistic Ignorance”. Encyclopedia of Social Psychology. Sage Publishing, 2007. <> Prentice, Deborah. A. y Dale. T. Miller. “Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64.2 (1993): 243-256. <> Podobnik, B. et ál. “Influence of Corruption on Economic Growth Rate and Foreign Investment”. The European Physical. Journal B 63 (2008): 547-550. <> Rimal, Rajiv. N. y Kevin Real. “How Behaviors are Influenced by Perceived Norms: A Test of the Theory of Normative Social Behavior”. Communication Research 32.3 (2005): 389-414. <> Rothstein, B. “Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories”. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12.4 (2000): 477-501. <> _____. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011. <> Rothstein, B. y M. Tanghammar. “The Mechanisms of Corruption: Cognition vs Interest”. QOG Working Paper Series 3 (2006). <> Sánchez, Juan I., Gómez, Carolina y Guillermo Wated. “A Value-Based Framework for Understanding Management Tolerance of Bribery in Latin America”. Journal of Business Ethics 83 (2008): 341-353. <> Schelling, T. C. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York, WW Norton, 1978. Schweitzer, H. “Corruption-its Spread and Decline”. The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. Eds. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Taube Markus y Matthias Schramm. London, editorial, 2004. 2-24. <> Senci, Carlos M. et ál. “The Influence of Prescriptive Norms and Negative Externalities on Bribery Decisions in the Lab”. Rationality and Society 31.3 (2019): 287-312. <> Serra, Danila. “Empirical Determinants of Corruption: A Sensitivity Analysis”. Public Choice 126.1 (2006): 225-256. <> Shalvi, Shaul et ál. “Self-Serving Justifications Doing Wrong and Feeling Moral”. Current Directions in Psychological Science 24.2 (2015): 125-130. <> Shleifer, A. y R. Vishny. “Corruption”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108.3 (1993): 599-617. <> Somers, Margaret y Fred Block. “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate”. American Sociological Review 70.2 (2005): 260-287. <> Sripada, C. S. y S. Stich. “A Framework for the Psychology of Norms”. Evolution and Cognition. The Innate Mind. Vol. 2. Eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence y Stephen Stich. Routledge: Oxford University Press, 2007. 280-301. <> Sunstein, Cass R. “Social Norms and Social Roles”. Columbia Law Review 96.4 (1996): 903-968. <> Sykes, Gresham M. y David Matza. “Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency”. American Sociological Review 22.6 (1957): 664-670. <> Tavits, Margit. “Why Do People Engage in Corruption? The Case of Estonia”. Social Forces 88.3 (2010): 1257-1279. <> Tenbrunsel, Ann E. y David Messick. “Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical behavior”. Social Justice Research 17 (2004): 223. <> Transparency International. “Corruption Perception Index 2014”. <> Treisman, D. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study”. Journal of Public Economics 76.3 (2000): 399-457. <> Udehn, Lars. “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism”. Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 479-507. <> Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. Varese, Federico. “The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-socialist Russia”. Political Studies 45 (1997): 579-596. <https://doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00097> Warren, M. E. “What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004a): 328-343. <> _____. “Social Capital and Corruption”. Democracy and Society 1.1 (2004b): 16-18. Wenzel, M. “Misperceptions of Social Norms about Tax Compliance: From Theory to Intervention”. Journal of Economic Psychology 26.6 (2005): 862-883. <> Willer, Robb, Kuwabara, Ko y Michael W. Macy. “The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms”. American Journal of Sociology 115 (2009): 451-490. <> Wouda, Jeroen et ál. “The Collaborative Roots of Corruption? A Replication of Weisel & Shalvi ‘2015’ ”. Collabra: Psychology 3.1 (2017): 27. <> Zaloznaya, Marina. “The Social Psychology of Corruption: Why It Does Not Exist and Why It Should”. Sociology Compass 8 (2014): 187-202. <> Zyglidopoulos, Stelios C., Fleming, Peter J., y Sandra Rothenberg. “Rationalization, Overcompensation and the Escalation of Corruption in Organizations”. Journal of Business Ethics 84.S1 (2009): 65-73. <>
Rights Derechos de autor 2019 Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia

Contact Us

The PKP Index is an initiative of the Public Knowledge Project.

For PKP Publishing Services please use the PKP|PS contact form.

For support with PKP software we encourage users to consult our wiki for documentation and search our support forums.

For any other correspondence feel free to contact us using the PKP contact form.

Find Us


Copyright © 2015-2018 Simon Fraser University Library